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Abstract 
 
With regard to moral judgments. Lawrence Kohlberg claimed that reason 
and logic lead to answers about right and wrong.  By contrast, Jonathan 
Haidt proposed an “emotivist” theory of morality in which feelings take 
center stage.  I tested Haidt’s theory of moral judgment by showing 59 
college undergraduate participants an abortion video while instructing them 
to increase, decrease, or make no attempt to change their level of emotion 
during the video.  I found that the video succeeded at both increasing 
negative emotions (particularly disgust) and changing abortion attitudes to a 
more pro-life stance.  Furthermore, the moral views of participants asked to 
down-regulate emotions by viewing the video analytically were less affected 
by the video. Implications and methodological problems are discussed. 
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Moral Emotion Regulation: The Case of Abortion Attitudes 
A Philosophical Divide 
 A tradition extending back to ancient Greece identified morality with 
rationality, implying that moral judgments were based on logic.  Western 
religion capitalized on this way of thinking; for example, Thomas Aquinas 
used Aristotelian logic in an attempt to justify religious morality. 
 David Hume, a Scottish thinker and a product of the enlightenment, 
questioned the significance of rationality in morality.  According to Hume, 
it is impossible “from reason alone … to distinguish betwixt moral good and 
evil” (Hume, 1740/2000, p. 457).  As an empiricist, Hume thought that 
reason, at best, could inform us of the means to achieve an end, but that 
reason had no place deciding the end in question.  For Hume, emotion fills 
this normative void; through emotion, we can structure our preferences for 
achieving goals (Morris, 2001). 
 Hume’s observations led him to believe that sympathy for humanity 
guides most people’s actions, for reason (i.e., rationality) does not allow us 
to make the logical leap from statements about what people do to statements 
about what people should do.  Reason can only provide statements of the 
former type.  We need goals to obtain statements of the latter type, and 
Hume thought that these goals were motivated by emotion (Cohon, 2004). 
 Immanuel Kant (1787) argued against Hume’s moral philosophy.  
According to Kant, Hume’s theory only described “hypothetical 
imperatives”—duties contingent upon certain goals.  However, according to 
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Kant, Hume ignored “categorical imperatives”—duties that are present 
regardless of one’s goals.  Kant suggested that we need to use reason to 
arrive at categorical imperatives because they are not goal oriented—they 
are not dependent upon someone’s whims or desires, and are instead 
universal.  Furthermore, he described a multi-step process to reason the 
morality of an action: propose an action, picture that action as a rule guiding 
all rational beings, and then decide whether you would will everyone to do 
what you are about to do (Johnson, 2004).  For instance, Kant believed that 
people should never lie because he pictured a world in which everybody lied 
and determined that this world was the worst possible world that could exist 
– nobody would ever want a world in which everybody lied.  Therefore, 
according to him, we should never lie.  Kant understood that people felt 
emotion at moral actions, but unlike Hume, he determined that emotion was 
a consequence of the action and not a cause.   
 Kantian and Humean insights on emotion and reason in morality 
have influenced 20
th
 century psychological thinkers, among them Lawrence 
Kohlberg.  Kohlberg tried to map the development of moral reasoning in 
boys by interviewing them about what a character should do given certain 
hypothetical dilemmas.  For instance, in one dilemma, Heinz’s wife is near 
death, the only cure available is a drug sold by a specific druggist, Heinz 
does not have enough money to buy the drug, and the druggist is unwilling 
to lower the price of the drug to accommodate Heinz.  The only way that 
Heinz could save his wife is to steal the drug.  Kohlberg told the boys that 
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Heinz stole the drug, asked the boys if Heinz should or should not have 
stolen the drug (and why), and then asked the boys if he should or should 
not be punished for stealing the drug (and why) (Rest, 1986 as cited in 
Anderson, 2004).  Kohlberg cared not about what decisions the boys made 
but the moral reasoning used to reach those decisions.  For instance, one boy 
could have said that Heinz should have stolen the drug because it is nice to 
help people, while another boy could have said that Heinz should not have 
stolen the drug because it is not nice to steal.  Kohlberg thought that the 
reasoning behind the decision (e.g. “it is nice to do this” or “it is not nice to 
do that”) indicated the moral stage, not the decision itself. 
 Through interviews with the boys, Kohlberg created a stage theory 
of moral decisions in which the “moral stage” corresponds to the highest 
level of moral thinking that the boy engages in his reasoning.  According to 
Kohlberg, as a child develops more mature moral reasoning processes by 
engaging with his environment, he develops the skills to make universal 
moral decisions based on logic rather than fear of punishment.  Moreover, 
Kohlberg set his stage theory so that his highest level of moral reasoning 
corresponds to the ideal Kantian processes of making moral decisions, such 
as universal rules, logical reasoning, and perspective taking (Krebs & 
Denton, 2005). 
Rationalism Challenged: Hume’s Return 
 The study of cognitive processes has dominated psychology since 
the 1960s, so it is no surprise that Kohlberg’s cognitive/rationalist theories 
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dominated moral psychology between 1960 and 1980.  However, in the late 
1970s and 1980s, experiments revealed a significant amount of non-
conscious processes in cognition.  For example, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
reviewed a study in which people who memorized the word pair ‘ocean-
moon’ were more likely to suggest Tide when asked for a detergent; 
however, when the participants were asked why they responded with Tide, 
they did not mention the words that they had to memorize - they made up 
other plausible reasons (for instance, “I like the Tide box” (p. 243)).  When 
asked if the memory task might have elicited the response, only one-third of 
the participants thought it possible.  This review called into question the 
legitimacy of introspection as a way to understand cognitive processes.  
Furthermore, automatic processes have been implicated in linguistics: 
people can easily decide whether or not a sentence is grammatical without 
being able to say why (Anderson, 2004). 
 A more relevant challenge to rationalist moral psychology came in 
Haidt’s (2001) paper, entitled “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A 
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.”  The main goal of this 
paper was to outline and defend a model of moral judgments based on 
intuition rather than reasoning
1
.  The basis of Haidt’s model is emotion; he 
proposed that emotion determines moral judgments by activating moral 
                                                 
1
 Haidt (2001) defined intuition as something that occurs “quickly, 
effortlessly, and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is 
accessible to consciousness” (p. 6) contrasted with reason, which occurs 
“more slowly, requires some effort, and requires at least some steps that are 
accessible to consciousness” (p. 6).  
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intuitions.  (Haidt recognized that occasionally, personal characteristics and 
knowledge would sometimes cause people to think rationally about a moral 
judgment.  People will sometimes mull over a decision that they have made, 
especially if they do not feel a strong emotion either way; therefore, he 
allowed a place for reason in his chain of moral reasoning, but it occurs at 
the end of the chain and only under very specific circumstances.) 
 Outlined briefly below is Haidt’s Social Intuitive Model (SIM) along 
with evidence supporting each of the first four links in the chain.  The fifth 
and sixth links are concessions to rationalist models, and they are only 
briefly described here (for a more complete description, see Haidt, 2001; 
also, see Figure 1 for a diagram). 
 1.  The Intuitive Judgment Link:  When confronted with a moral 
dilemma, a controversial issue, or a transgression, it is assumed that 
everyone has an immediate emotional reaction and a rightness or wrongness 
intuition.  These intuitions occur well before any conscious reasoning can 
take place. 
 Supporting this step, Haidt cited studies in which participants 
evaluated stimuli as positive or negative as soon as those stimuli were 
presented, well before any conscious deliberation could have taken place 
(Zajonc, 1980, as cited in Haidt, 2001).  Furthermore, several studies have 
demonstrated that emotions correlate with moral decisions (e.g. Moll et al., 
2002; Greene, 2001), with one study showing that inducing a negative mood 
in a participant will lead him or her to make harsher judgments than 
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inducing a positive mood in the participant (Forgas & Moylan, 1987).  This 
suggests that emotion may precede and contribute to moral decisions. 
 2.  The Post Hoc Reasoning Link:  After a person automatically 
makes a decision regarding his or her moral position on an issue, he or she 
searches for reasons supporting the decision that he or she has just made.  
This step is effortful as contrasted with the easy and automatic decision-
making step.  Anderson (2004) suggested that even though the reasoning 
occurs after the judgment, the person making the judgment might still think 
that the reasoning occurred first.  
 Supporting this step, Haidt cited several research studies (e.g. Kuhn, 
1991; Kunda, 1990) concluding that “everyday reasoning is heavily marred 
by the biased search only for reasons that support one’s already-stated 
hypothesis” (p. 818); however, as far back as Festinger (1957), studies have 
shown that a need for consistency can cause people to change their 
cognitions in response to their own behavior. 
 3.  The Reasoned Persuasion Link:  After people decide the 
reasoning for their viewpoints, they will try to use his or her newly created 
reasons to persuade others of their opinions.  Haidt theorized that even 
though people might try to use logic to persuade other people to accept their 
moral positions, the most successful avenue of persuasion is through affect. 
 Supporting this step, Haidt cited research demonstrating that 
attitudes are most responsive to change through affective means (e.g., 
Edwards & von Hippel, 1995; Shavitt, 1990, both as cited in Haidt, 2001).  
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If the intuitive judgment link and post hoc reasoned link occur in the 
suggested order (i.e. people have initial, affective reactions and then decide 
their reasons post hoc), then moral attitudes are affectively based, so 
methods of changing affect would best serve to change moral attitudes. 
 4.  The Social Persuasion Link:  As the model indicates, some of the 
links in this moral judgment sequence may be bypassed as a result of social 
persuasion.  Someone might decide how he or she feels about an issue not 
by the arguments being presented but by the position of the persuader 
relative to the person being persuaded.  For example, think of President 
Bush’s reaction to Al Gore’s movie “An Inconvenient Truth,” or the 
Republican (or Democrat) response to Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 9-11.”  
These movies were universally supported by their respective political party, 
and unsupported by the opposing party, not because of the arguments 
presented but because of the people making the arguments. 
 The power of social persuasion was elegantly demonstrated by the 
research of Soloman Asch (1956).  Asch showed how individuals are 
influenced to conform when confronted with a consensus attitude in a group.  
The individuals can be as close as loved ones (Davis & Rusbult, 2001), but 
they can also be as distant as classroom peers (Newcomb, 1943).  Moreover, 
the more respected the individuals who hold these beliefs, the greater the 
degree of persuasion and conformity they foster among observers. 
 5.  The Reasoned Judgment Link:  Rarely, a person can actually 
reason his or her way to a judgment through logic.  This process serves as 
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the basis for the Kohlbergian model, but Haidt claims that this only happens 
when the person has weak intuitions and has the time and cognitive 
resources necessary for reflection.  As mentioned by Haidt (2001), 
philosophers might use the fifth link of his chain.  Furthermore, if the person 
does have a strong intuition in one direction and he or she reasons his or her 
way to another decision, the latter might be expressed in words while the 
former might manifest itself under the surface. 
 6.  The Private Reflection Link:  Also, rarely, a person might use role 
playing or perspective taking to activate a new intuition supporting a 
different moral judgment.  If several, competing intuitions are strong, then 
the person might pick the strongest of the intuitions or use an abstract 
principle to decide his or her moral reasoning. 
 In summary, Haidt allows that reason and emotion can both affect 
moral judgments, but it is clear that he finds emotional determinants to be 
stronger, leading other scholars to critique his theory. 
 Pizzaro and Bloom (2003) critiqued Haidt’s theory, focusing on the 
order of the stages and the relative centrality of the fifth and sixth stages 
compared to the others.  For instance, they agreed that intuitions shape 
moral decisions; however, they thought that prior moral reasoning initiated 
intuitions.  Moreover, they proposed that if people wanted to change their 
emotional reaction to an event, they could learn to react differently to the 
event over time – they could cognitively control their reaction.  In a 
published response to these scholars, Haidt (2003) agreed that people could 
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sometimes change the way they felt about an issue. However, he pointed out 
that most changes in intuitive reactions (spurred, often, by social influence, 
the fourth link in his chain) occur because we try to “morally mesh” (p. 197) 
with people whom we consider to have similar (not contrary) points of view.  
As an attempt to refute Haidt’s claim, Pizzaro and Bloom pointed out a 
study in which students with implicit racism
2
 attended a class to lessen their 
implicit stereotyping (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001).  However, Haidt 
replied that the students attended the class not because they wanted to 
override their initial reactions, but because they hated racism and wanted to 
be around other people who also hated racism, suggesting that people rarely 
seek out challenges to their original intuitions. 
 Saltzstein and Kasachoff (2004) criticized Haidt for downplaying the 
role of reasoning in moral decision making.  They offered a compromise 
between Kohlberg and Haidt, claiming that “sometimes [intuitions] are the 
result of our moral beliefs” (p. 276).  They argued that many times people 
have no intuitions about certain issues (they used cloning pets or using 
aborted fetuses for medical research as examples of when that happens), so 
they reason their way to the moral decision, and their reasoning shapes their 
intuitions.  Supporting this claim, they cited research on systematic vs. 
                                                 
2
An example of implicit racism is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), 
where participants might express a certain outward belief (e.g. African 
Americans are just as good as Caucasians), but when tested for speed on a 
computer, the participants respond slower to African American faces paired 
with positive adjectives than to Caucasians faces paired with positive 
adjectives, suggesting that African Americans and positive adjectives are 
incongruous (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
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heuristic processing (Kelman, 1961 as cited in Saltzstein & Kasachoff, 
2004), central vs. peripheral routes to persuasion
3
 (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, 
as cited in Saltzstein & Kasachoff, 2004) and their own research on 
heteronomous vs. autonomous changes in moral judgments
4
 (Saltzstein et al, 
2004 as cited in Saltzstein & Kasachoff, 2004).  These studies suggest that 
moral persuasion could arrive peripherally through automatic processes (i.e., 
emotion first, then reasoning as in the Haidt paper) or centrally through 
deliberate processes (i.e., reasoning first, then emotion, as in Kohlberg). 
 Haidt (2004) responded forcefully to Saltztein and Kasachoff’s 
(2004) critique of his model, claiming that Saltzstein and Kasachoff 
critiqued a simplified view of his model wherein intuition shapes judgment, 
which then, in turn, shapes reasoning.  Haidt commented that Saltzstein and 
Kasachoff forgot the most important aspect of the model: the social aspect, 
wherein people use their reasons to persuade other people, and in turn are 
persuaded by other people’s reasons.  As Haidt suggested, “ordinary people 
do not spontaneously look for evidence on both sides of a judgment 
question.  People engage in moral reasoning not so much to figure things out 
                                                 
3
 The central route of persuasion is when somebody considers the pros and 
cons of a particular issue before he or she decides his or her opinion, while 
the peripheral route of persuasion is when somebody “makes a inference 
about the merits of the advanced position based on simple cues in the 
persuasion context” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979, p. 135).  An example of the 
peripheral route of persuasion is agreeing with somebody just because he or 
she is an expert. 
4
 Heteronomous changes in moral judgments occur when a child changes 
moral beliefs partly because of obedience to adult authority, whereas 
autonomous changes in moral judgments occur when a child decides his or 
her opinion of a moral issue by himself or herself. 
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for themselves, in private, but to influence others” (p. 284).  Indeed, Haidt 
asserted that links 3 and 4 of his chain influence people in different ways; 
link 3 (the reasoned persuasion link) can influence people through reason, 
while link 4 (the social persuasion link) can influence people through social 
compliance.  However, even in central vs. peripheral routes to persuasion, 
most people at most times use the peripheral route because it takes less 
effort; furthermore, as William James (1902/1906) noted, “[reason] will fail 
to convince or convert you all the same, if your dumb intuitions are opposed 
to its conclusions” (p. 74). 
 Saltzstein and Kasachoff (2004) also argued that “in the absence of 
any statement of possible empirical counterevidence, one might well 
conclude that the proposal offered by Haidt is not empirically 
disconfirmable and, thus, also not empirically verifiable” (p. 279).  
However, Haidt (2001) cited studies that linked deficits of moral emotions 
and tendencies towards psychopathy (Cleckley, 1955 as cited in Haidt, 
2001), that linked psychopathy with atrophied regions of the brain thought 
to control emotion (e.g. Mednick et al., 1982, Raine et al., 1994, and 
Damasio, 1994 as cited in Haidt, 2001), and that showed no link between an 
ability to know the right moral lifestyle and the practice of that lifestyle 
(Damasio, 1994 as cited in Haidt, 2001).  Furthermore, recent studies have 
demonstrated that differences in moral judgments can occur without 
differences in the arguments being presented.  For example, Wheatley and 
Haidt (2005 as cited in Haidt & Bjorklund, 2005) found that hypnotizing 
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groups to feel disgust at certain words made their moral judgments more 
severe than non-hypnotized control groups when those words were included 
in the moral statement, but there was no difference when those words were 
not included in the moral statement.  Moreover, many hypnotized 
participants rated a non-moral situation as morally wrong when the disgust-
inducing words were included in the statement.  Even when the disgust did 
not relate to the moral situation at all, by having students sit next to a filthy 
or clean table, “some subjects [when seated at the filthy desk]…judged the 
scenarios to be worse than subjects seated at the clean desk” (Schnall, Haidt, 
& Clore, 2005 as cited in Prinz, 2004). 
 As a strong indicator of intuitions shaping moral judgments, Haidt, 
Bjorklund and Murphy (2005 as cited in Haidt & Bjorklund, 2004) 
demonstrated that for a behavior that induces disgust (e.g. incestuous sex), 
even with countervailing reasons (e.g. the couple used multiple forms of 
contraception and felt no ill emotional aftereffects), people still thought that 
the act was wrong.  The experimenter would ask the participants why the act 
was wrong, and the participants would continue to give reasons.  Even when 
the experimenter satisfied all of the participants’ reasons for thinking that 
the act was wrong, the participants still insisted that it had to be wrong.  
Why was it wrong?  It was wrong because it was wrong; the participants 
could not think of any more reasons.  Haidt et al. (2005) called this 
phenomenon “moral dumbfounding,” and used it to suggest that when an 
intuition shapes a moral judgment, people will hold onto that judgment even 
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when there are no longer reasons for their having that judgment.  Therefore, 
research by Haidt involving the induction of disgust demonstrated that 
intuitions can precede moral judgments, and people often refuse to change 
their mind when their moral judgments stem from a strong intuition, even 
when there is evidence demonstrating flaws in their reasons for holding 
those moral judgments.  We hope to replicate these results using emotion 
regulation as a way to control participants’ negative emotions to see if moral 
judgments are more likely to change without emotionally based intuitions. 
Emotion Regulation 
 Emotions are thought to be an adaptive mechanism to avoid 
dangerous situations.  Gross (1999) described the adaptive value of fear: 
“when we are afraid, our senses are sharpened, our muscles are primed to 
move us quickly out of harm’s way, and our cardiovascular system is tuned 
to provide increased oxygen and energy to large muscle groups that will be 
called upon when we flee” (p. 556).  All of these reactions occur without 
any cognitive thought, allowing our reaction to bypass our slow, deliberate 
cognition.  However, often our emotional reactions are uncomfortable and 
counterproductive.  Negative emotions have developed as a way to avoid 
harmful situations, such as when we need to flee immediately from a fearful 
bear or avoid drinking bacteria-ridden liquid.  However, rarely do we 
encounter such dangerous situations.  Furthermore, technology has 
increased the amount of danger caused by acting on emotional impulse.  For 
example, “an irritable swipe that once scarcely raised a welt, is now 
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translated with the greatest ease into a fatal car accident or gun-related 
homicide” (Gross, 1999, p. 558).   
 Therefore, to deal with modern society, people need to both increase 
and decrease positive and negative emotions at certain times.  People 
attempt to decrease emotions when the emotions “prompt behavioral 
responses that are no longer useful” (Gross, 1999, p. 558), as in the man 
who shoots someone who irritates him on the highway.  People attempt to 
increase positive emotions when, for example, someone is depressed but 
does not want to come off that way to friends. 
 According to the “emotion generation model,” people first evaluate 
their internal and external cues, these evaluations lead to behavioral, 
experiential, and physical responses, and based on the modulation of these 
responses, final emotional expression takes place (Gross, 1999).  People can 
modulate emotions by selecting the situation they encounter, changing the 
environment they encounter, choosing the way they attend to aspects of the 
environment, changing the way they think about the environment, or trying 
to change the expression of the emotions after they occur. 
 The two most studied emotion regulation strategies are cognitive 
reappraisal and suppression.  Cognitive reappraisal is defined as changing 
the way somebody thinks about the environment to keep unwanted emotions 
from happening in the first place, while suppression is defined as attempting 
to limit emotional expression after the emotions occur.  Through cognitive 
reappraisal, a person can either up-regulate his or her emotion (change the 
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way he or she labels an object to feel more emotion toward that object) or 
down-regulate his or her emotion (change the way he or she labels an object 
to feel less emotion toward that object).  For negative stimuli, somebody can 
up-regulate his or her emotion by imagining things getting worse or by 
imagining somebody close to him or her involved in the stimuli. 
Conversely, he or she can down-regulate his or her emotion by imagining 
things getting better or imagining his or her objective distance from the 
stimuli (Gross, 1998).  Oshner et al. (2004) tested up-regulation and down-
regulation strategies, and found that participants generated different 
physiological changes (as measured by an fMRI) and different emotional 
experiences by up-regulating as compared with down-regulating. 
 As an attempt at establishing how suppression and reappraisal affect 
daily experiences, Gross (2002) used individual differences in an emotional 
regulation questionnaire to determine if participants used suppression or 
reappraisal to regulate their emotions.  He found that use of suppression was 
correlated with lower positive emotion experience, lower negative emotion 
expression, and higher negative emotion experience (although the 
relationship was weak), while the use of reappraisal was correlated with 
higher positive emotion experience and lower negative emotion experience.  
Moreover, Gross (1998) tested cognitive reappraisal and suppression with 
items that elicited disgust in an American population.  He found that 
reappraisal decreased the participants’ expressive behavior and overall 
perception of disgust, while suppression intensified physiological reaction 
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without changing perception.  These results suggest that if participants 
reappraise a situation so as to experience less negative emotion, they will 
indeed experience less negative emotion, whereas if participants only 
suppress their feelings, they might not change their experience or they might 
actually experience greater negative emotion. 
Moral Emotions and General Thesis of the Current Study 
 Given an ability to regulate emotional reactions, how might changes 
in emotional reaction influence moral judgments?.  Tangney, Stuewig, and 
Mashek (2006) divided moral emotions into two kinds: inwardly projected 
moral emotions (e.g., shame, guilt) and outwardly projected moral emotions 
(e.g., anger, disgust).  Although inwardly directed emotions might influence 
outward moral judgments, not enough research has examined the 
association, so we instead focus on outwardly directed moral emotions.  
Rozin et al. (1999) classified three outwardly directed, negatively valenced 
emotions; furthermore, they found that each of these emotions corresponded 
to one of Shweder et al.’s (1997) ethics
5
.  According to their Contempt 
Anger Disgust (CAD) triad hypothesis, people experience contempt when 
someone violates standards of their community (e.g. a violation of 
expectations relating to social hierarchy), people experience anger when 
someone violates their autonomy (e.g. violations of rights), and people 
experience disgust when someone violates their divinity (e.g. reminders of 
our animal nature, including seeing a rotting body).  Even though Rozin et 
                                                 
5
 See Shweder et al.’s (1997) for a more complete description of autonomy 
codes, community codes, and divinity codes. 
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al. (1999) noted that “the divinity code is so foreign to the moral system 
used by educated Americans that most of [his] participants assigned … such 
violations to the nonmoral category” (p. 581), Goldenberg et al. (2001) 
found that people who were reminded of their own mortality exhibited 
higher levels of disgust at animal things than people who did not have the 
same primes.  Furthermore, Rozin et al. (1997) found that many American 
vegetarians (who became vegetarians for moral reasons) exhibited a high 
level of disgust at meat.  Moreover, if we consider the antigay agenda of 
many Evangelicals, the recent uproar over the husband of Terri Schaivo and 
the court system allowing her to die, and the abortion debate, we find that 
people do sometimes use the divine as a source of their moral judgments, 
and therefore, possibly exhibit disgust as part of the justification.     
 Therefore, if Haidt’s thesis holds, and moral judgments are 
instigated by emotional reactions, then people who feel more anger, 
contempt, and/or disgust at a situation should judge the situation as more 
morally wrong than people who do not feel those emotions.  Furthermore, 
because Gross (1998) has provided evidence of the efficacy of emotional 
regulation as a way of controlling emotional reaction to a stimulus, emotion 
regulation should provide a way of experimentally manipulating how much 
negative emotion participants feel, and consequently, change their moral 
judgment of a stimulus.  In other words, because cognitive down-regulation 
can limit bad emotional experience, people who watch a video designed to 
instill negative emotions while down-regulating their emotional reaction 
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should feel less of an emotional change than people who do nothing who 
up-regulate their emotional reaction.  Furthermore, down regulators should 
show a smaller change in moral judgment after watching the video. 
The Current Study 
 Abortion is a moral issue, straddling the ethical divide between an 
individual’s rights and religious values.  Pro-life adherents believe that pro-
choice sentiment is a consequence of living in an institutionalized and 
academic world where people can rationalize almost anything.  
Furthermore, according to Gorney (2004), the pro-lifers believe that most 
people are complacent, and despite general opposition to unrestricted 
abortions (at least in private), most people do not want to rethink a 
notoriously political issue.  The only way that pro-life supporters think that 
they can win the abortion issue is “visuals – literal visuals, to shock people 
from complacently; and verbal descriptions that force people to keep 
picturing what actually takes place in an abortion-procedure room” (Gorney, 
2004, p. 36). 
 People who are against abortion couch the procedure in emotional 
terms: “’If you’re holding that child in your hand, and knowingly killing the 
child, you can’t argue any more that it’s not really a human being.  You just 
can’t do it’” (Keri Folmar, quoted in Gorney, 2004, p. 38).  Supporting the 
Haidtian moral theory, Keri Folmar did not even describe the reasoning for 
her moral opinion.  Abortion was just wrong – looking at the child, and then 
imagining the child dying right in front of her gave her all the reasons she 
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needed.  She had an immediate emotional reaction (sadness and disgust), 
and then without even citing reasons for holding her view, she insisted that 
her view was one everybody would share, emotionally. 
 The pro-life movement has created videos of partial birth abortions 
so that people will come face to face with the gruesome procedure.  
Supporters hope that people will feel anger at the doctors, disgust at the 
operation, and thus motivation to join them on their crusade to restrict 
abortion rights.  They created the “Center For Bioethical Reform” and 
published videos with titles like “Silent Scream,” “The Hard Truth,” “The 
Harder Truth,” “Choice Blues” and more, each video designed to appeal 
through emotional images and sounds, and hopefully, persuade people to 
become pro-life. 
 Very few studies have examined the efficacy of these videos or their 
method of persuasion.  To test their method of persuasion, and 
consequently, the accuracy of the first step in Haidt’s model, I showed one 
of the videos, “The Harder Truth” to college students.  My first hypothesis 
was that if college students are affected emotionally by the video, they 
should increase their negative emotional reaction and in turn, change their 
abortion attitudes to a more pro-life stance.  However, to further test the 
structure of their attitudes, I also asked participants to differentially regulate 
their emotions.  My second hypothesis is that people who down-regulated 
their emotions would feel less negative moral emotion and consequently 
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would change their attitudes less than people who up-regulated or did not 
control their emotions. 
Method 
Participants 
 I recruited 59 participants (37 males, 21 females) from the Syracuse 
University Introductory Psychology applicant pool.  Most of the participants 
were freshmen (n = 48), but the sample also included a few sophomores (n = 
5), juniors (n = 4), and seniors (n = 1).  Participants were aged 18 (n = 27), 
19 (n = 19), 20 (n = 6), 21 (n = 5), and 22 (n = 1).  Most of the participants 
were Caucasian (n = 35), with some African Americans and Hispanics (n = 
9 and n = 6, respectively).  The remaining participants reported other 
ethnicities.  I assigned participants subject numbers and to one of three 
categories according to an online random number generator.  Twenty 
participants were randomly chosen for the up-regulation condition, 23 for 
the down-regulation condition, and 16 for the control condition. 
Materials 
 Each of the participants viewed a video and completed several 
questionnaires.  The 4 min video “The Harder Truth” released by the Center 
for Bioethical Reform depicts recently aborted second and third trimester 
fetuses.  The film opens with a 4 sec clip of the title over a black screen.  
Following the clip, only visual images are used to create persuasive effect; 
the video is silent.  The film’s website recommends that anyone in 7th grade 
and above should be allowed to see the film. 
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 I used four standardized rating scales in our study and one open 
ended questionnaire.  The open-ended questionnaire asked participants to 
“describe how your emotions changed while watching the video,” “describe 
what went through your mind while watching the video,” and “describe how 
your inner dialogue changed your emotions.”  I wanted to use this 
questionnaire as a check to see if our participants followed directions while 
watching the video, and to have a qualitative description of our participants’ 
experiences. 
 We added two items (disgust and nausea) to the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988), as a way to 
discretely measure the change in participant disgust as a function of our 
video priming manipulation.  The original PANAS asked participants to rate 
on a scale of 1 (Very Slightly or Not At All) to 5 (Extremely) how intensely 
they felt 20 emotions ranging from interested, exited, and happy, to sad and 
angry.  Watson et al. (1998) found that the PANAS factored onto two 
loadings, which they called Positive Affect and Negative Affect.  Both 
factors correlated highly with previous affect, depression, and anxiety 
measures.  Furthermore, each factor correlated highly with predicted 
measures of positive and negative affect; negative affect correlated with 
stress, while positive affect changed based on social activity. 
 The Abortion Attitudes Questionnaire (Stets & Leik, 1993) 
contained 20 questions assessing people’s opinion about abortion.  The 
questions ranged from strong feelings against abortion (e.g. “Abortion is 
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murder”) to rather weak feelings against abortion (e.g. “Abortion after the 
third trimester is murder”).  The questions were originally rated on a 7-point 
scale, but I put the questions on a continuous online scale with 1000 
possible responses for each question.  The participants were instructed to 
move the cursor to how strongly they felt for or against any of the questions.  
I changed the scale from a discrete 7-point scale to a continuous scale to 
prevent carry-over effects, since the participants completed the scale several 
times.   
 The last two questionnaires, the Bodily Cues Questionnaire (Miller 
et al., 1981) and the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 
2003) were used to check how much the participant pays attention to bodily 
cues and how much natural emotional regulation the participant engages in 
during his or her day to day experiences.  In each of the questionnaires, the 
participant rated from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) five and 
ten items respectively on each of the specified topics (See Appendix A). 
Procedure 
 Each of the 59 participants entered a small, individual computer 
room with low lighting.  After they gave written informed consent to 
participate, the experimenter asked them to fill out the first PANAS and 
explained that they had to mark how they felt each of the emotions “on 
average.”  The experimenter then put on the computer screen the first 
Abortion Attitudes Questionnaire and explained the instructions to the 
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participant; the experimenter then left the room and let the participant fill 
out the questionnaire in solitude. 
 When the participant finished the Abortion Questionnaire, the 
experimenter read instructions on how the participant should watch the 
video.  I took, as a prototype of our instructions, the instructions that Gross 
(1998) used for his emotion regulation experiment.  Our up-regulation 
instructions were as follows: 
I will show you the video in just a moment.  Please view it 
very carefully, and make sure to pay attention to the entire 
video.  In addition, I would like to see how well you can 
control the way you view things. Therefore, it is important to 
me that as you watch the video, you try your best not to stifle 
any emotions you may feel in response to it.  Instead, try to 
take emotional perspectives relevant to what you're seeing in 
the video.  Think about what you are seeing in such a way 
that you feel a great deal about the situations depicted.  
Our down-regulation instructions were as follows: 
I will show you the video in just a moment.  Please view it 
very carefully, and make sure to pay attention to the entire 
video. In addition, I would like to see how well you can 
control the way you view things.  Therefore, it is very 
important to me that you try your best to view this video 
from the detached perspective of a medical professional 
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learning about a surgical procedure.  In other words, as you 
watch the video, try to think about it objectively and 
analytically rather than personally and emotionally.  Think 
about what you are seeing in such a way that you don't feel 
anything at all. 
Our no-regulation (control) instructions were as follows: 
I will show you the video in just a moment.  Please view it 
very carefully and make sure to pay attention to the entire 
video. 
 Following the instructions, I asked the participant to paraphrase the 
instructions as a check for understanding, explaining the instructions again 
to them if they had misinterpreted them.  Then I maximized the size of the 
video screen, pushed play on the video (I started exactly 4 seconds into the 
video and ended exactly 4 minutes into the video), closed the door, and let 
them watch the video alone.  After they finished the video, I asked them to 
complete the Abortion Attitudes Questionnaire again, then I asked them to 
complete the PANAS (instead of average emotion I wanted to know how 
much emotion they felt during the video), the Open Ended Questionnaire, 
the Bodily Cues Questionnaire, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, and 
then a demographics questionnaire in that order.  I then dismissed the 
participant. 
 Two weeks following the initial study, I asked each of the 
participants to fill out the third PANAS (again, asking how much emotion 
25 
they felt at the time they filled out the questionnaire) and the third Abortion 
Attitudes Questionnaire, each accessed through a link I sent to their e-mail. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 I calculated a total score for the abortion questionnaire summing the 
individual questions.  I scaled the abortion questionnaire so that each 
question ranged from 0 to 1000.  I wanted the scale to have as many data 
points as possible so that the participant would not be able to remember his 
or her previous responses when asked to complete the abortion attitudes 
questionnaire for the second and third times.  Because there were 20 
questions on the questionnaire, the minimum possible score was 0 and the 
maximum possible score was 20,000.  Certain items were reverse-scored, 
such that for each question a higher score related to a more pro-choice 
stance, while a lower score related to a more pro-life stance.  Therefore, if I 
subtracted the total abortion score of the second time from the total abortion 
score of the first time, a positive number would indicate that the participant 
became more pro-life. 
 Scores on the initial abortion questionnaire (i.e. the abortion 
questionnaire before I showed participants the abortion video) ranged from 
138 to 18998.  I found that the up-regulation condition scores ranged from 
702 to 18928 (M = 13445.5, SD = 5018.15), the down-regulation condition 
scores ranged from 3406 to 18410 (M = 12208.70, SD = 4694.44), the no-
regulation condition scores ranged from 138 to 18742 (M = 12297, SD = 
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4787.18).  I performed a one-way ANOVA on scores of the initial abortion 
questionnaire for condition, and found no effect of condition on initial 
abortion score (F = .410, p = .666).  This suggests that the initial 
randomization for abortion scores worked and that there was no meaningful 
difference in abortion attitudes between the groups prior to watching the 
abortion video.  Thus, any differences in the changes of abortion score 
between groups should not have occurred because of differences in initial 
abortion attitudes. 
 On the abortion attitudes questionnaire immediately following the 
video, scores in the up-regulation condition ranged from 82 to 19168 (M = 
10993.3, SD = 5685.13), scores in the down-regulation condition ranged 
from 1310 to 18138 (M = 10915.04, SD = 4991) and scores in the no-
regulation condition ranged from 126 to 15708 (M = 9778.13, SD = 
4448.20).  Paired samples t-tests indicated that abortion scores significantly 
changed between the initial assessment (before the video) and the second 
assessment (after the video) for the entire group of participants (t = 6.592, p 
< .001).  Furthermore, measures of effect size using Cohen’s d indicated a 
moderate change in abortion attitudes (d = .41).  Just by watching the video, 
the participants became somewhat more pro-life.  This indicates that overall, 
the video was effective at changing abortion attitudes in the desired 
direction. 
 Not all of our participants completed the two-week follow-up 
questionnaire; only 14 out of 20 in the up-regulation condition, 15 out of 23 
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in the down-regulation condition, and 12 out of 16 in the no-regulation 
condition.  This is fewer than I had hoped would; however, I had a server 
malfunction and I also had issues with the operating systems of our 
participant’s personal computers (they could not fill out the follow-up 
questionnaire on a Macintosh). 
 Results from the follow-up testing indicated that scores in the up-
regulation condition ranged from 1174 to 19488 (M = 10272.71, SD = 
5943.31), scores in the down-regulation condition ranged from 2898 to 
16826 (M = 11210.4, SD = 4336.08), while scores in the no-regulation 
condition ranged from 154 to 14592 (M = 9212.17, SD = 4509.77).  Paired 
samples t-tests indicated that abortion scores did not change significantly 
between the second assessment (after the video) and the third assessment 
(two weeks following the video) for the entire group of participants (t = -
.454, p = .653).  This suggests that the effect of the video was maintained 
beyond the short-term memory stage. 
 Figure 2 displays the mean abortion attitudes by condition.  The 
slopes of the up-regulation condition and the no-regulation condition appear 
to be similar, suggesting that our up-regulation instructions did not lead to 
results different from those of the control group instructions.  Compared to 
the no-regulation condition, the down-regulation condition slope between 
time one and time two was less steep, suggesting that our down-regulation 
instructions were effective and the participants in the down-regulation 
condition did not change their abortion attitudes as much as participants in 
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the no-regulation condition.  Furthermore, compared to the up-regulation 
condition, the down-regulation condition slope between time two and time 
three was less negative, suggesting that the video had less of a lasting effect 
on those participants who down-regulated their emotions.  However, 
although the graph suggests an association, it does not provide the precision 
needed to assess statistical significance. 
Effects of Condition on Abortion Attitudes 
 I performed several t-tests to assess whether participants in the 
down-regulation condition had less of a change in abortion attitudes than 
participants in the no-regulation group and participants in the up-regulation 
group.  I first created a difference score by subtracting the total score on the 
second abortion attitudes questionnaire from the total score on the first 
abortion attitudes questionnaire for each participant.  This new score 
represented the total change in abortion attitudes.  Because the participant 
did not do anything other than watch the video between the two 
assessments, the difference between the first and second scores could only 
be due to the video and measurement error. 
 After performing an independent samples t-test comparing the 
change in up-regulation abortion attitudes and the change in no-regulation 
abortion attitudes, I found no effect for the up-regulation condition 
compared with the no regulation condition (t = -.086, p = .932).  Because 
the variance of the up-regulation condition was significantly greater than the 
variance of the no-regulation condition (F = 7.722, p = .009), I believe that 
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the reason the up-regulation condition had no effect is that either the 
participants did not understand the up-regulation directions or that they had 
trouble implementing the up-regulation directions.  This could be due to a 
disparity between our instructions to feel more emotion toward the video 
and a natural tendency to try to limit their emotional experience toward the 
video. 
 I then performed an independent samples t-test comparing the 
change in down-regulation abortion attitudes and the change in no-
regulation abortion attitudes; furthermore, I compared the change in down-
regulation abortion attitudes and the change in up-regulation abortion 
attitudes.  I found that the difference between the down-regulation and no-
regulation conditions approached significance (t = -1.951, p = .059) and the 
effect size was rather large (d = .635), while the difference between the 
down-regulation and up-regulation conditions was not significant (t = 1.468, 
p = .151).  Again, I think that the misunderstanding of the up-regulation 
condition hid an effect of the difference between up-regulation changes in 
abortion attitudes and down-regulation changes in abortion attitudes.  
Furthermore, I had very few participants per condition, and if I had more 
participants, I would have had more power to detect statistically significant 
differences. 
 Next, I examined the change between abortion attitudes immediately 
following the video and abortion attitudes two weeks following the video.  
As expected, I found no difference between the up-regulation condition and 
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the no-regulation condition (t = .069, p = .946), no difference between the 
down-regulation condition and the no-regulation condition (t = .808, p = 
.427), and no difference between the down-regulation condition and the no-
regulation condition (t = -.427, p = .672).  However, I also found no 
difference between the change of abortion attitudes for the entire group of 
participants and 0 (t = -.454, p = .653), suggesting that the attitudes between 
the second and third distribution of the questionnaire did not change 
significantly.  Therefore, for all conditions, the video had a lasting effect on 
abortion attitudes that persisted at least two weeks following the video. 
Emotion and Abortion Attitudes 
 I first checked to see if disgust and negative emotions (e.g. 
distressed, upset, hostile, and disgusted) changed from before to after the 
video.  As I predicted, the video significantly changed whether or not our 
participants thought they felt both disgust (t = -11.034, p < .001, d = 1.950) 
and negative emotions (t = 9.972, p < .001, d = 1.696).  I also found that the 
number of negative emotions after the video had a significant relationship 
with scores on the second abortion attitudes questionnaire (r = -.336).  
However, after removing from our data set the participants from the up-
regulation condition, neither the change in disgust (r = -.086) nor the change 
in negative emotions (r = -.099) from the first questionnaire to the second 
questionnaire correlated significantly with the participants’ condition. 
 The lack of a correlation and the very strong emotion change from 
before the video to after the video suggest one of two things: either the 
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manipulation did not differentially alter disgust and negative emotions or 
something prevented participants from expressing this difference in a way 
that I could analyze.  Because disgust and negative emotions significantly 
changed from before the video to after the video, I feel that the video altered 
disgust; also, placing our participants in different conditions did almost 
significantly change the way they reacted to the video.  However, two 
qualities of the PANAS prevented us from observing accurate changes in 
emotional experience.  First, the PANAS only measures gross changes in 
emotions; I would have no way of differentiating between small changes in 
disgust (e.g. the scale cannot differentiate between a 4.0 and a 4.1).  Second, 
I may be seeing a ceiling effect; the scale has a maximum level of five.  
Since a large majority of our participants gave ratings of “5” on the scale, I 
could not tell if participants in the no-regulation condition would have put 
down a 8.9 if given the chance while participants in the down-regulation 
condition would have put down a 7.2 if given the chance.  In addition, 
because my hypothesis is that people make judgments about things 
intuitively and then rationalize it after, a scale where people judge their own 
disgust is an inadequate measure for implicit and automatic reactions.  If I 
cannot expect participants to know what is persuading them to change their 
intuitive reactions, how can I expect participants to accurately describe the 
disgust that is initiating those changes?  I should have instituted a 
physiological measure that could have captured minute changes in 
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emotional reactions and prevented the introspective error that might have 
resulted from using the PANAS. 
The Open Ended Questionnaire 
 I distributed a questionnaire to document our participants’ perception 
of their emotion regulation and how that affected their attitudes toward the 
video.  Most of the participants in the down-regulation condition found it 
difficult to control their emotion to the video.  One person wrote, “ I tried to 
stay as neutral as possible during the video; however it was impossible,” and 
then continued, “it’s one thing to talk about abortions and form opinions on 
them; however, after seeing one … it did change my emotions toward 
abortions; I now find it disgusting.”  Another person explained, “I was 
trying to stay detached as instructed but I couldn’t help thinking things to 
myself and they were thoughts that matched my emotions, which made it 
personal to my beliefs and moral … I wondered how many other 
[introductory Psychology] students threw up who saw this because I know I 
have a strong stomach but this really disgusts me.” 
 However, some of the participants used emotion regulation to 
successfully lower their emotion toward the video.  For instance, one of the 
down-regulation participants wrote, “my ‘inner dialogue’ kind of ‘calmed 
me down’ because … I was not watching this for pleasure – rather 
analytically.”  Another person, who had a child, wrote “I told myself that 
everyone makes [his or her] own choices and that everything happens for a 
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reason, which made me able to look at the film simply as a procedure.  I still 
felt uneasy at the end of the film, but oddly almost numb to it.” 
Discussion 
Main Research Findings 
 I attempted to evaluate Haidt’s socio-intuitive model of moral 
judgments.  Furthermore, I wanted to explore the persuasive power of 
videos designed to change a person’s moral stance.  Thus, I had our 
participants regulate their emotions to an abortion video, hypothesizing that 
people who down-regulated their emotions would feel less emotion and 
consequently, change their abortion attitudes less, than people who up-
regulated their emotions or people who did not change their emotions. 
 I found several important effects predicted by our hypotheses.  First, 
negative emotions negatively correlated with pro-choice abortion attitudes, 
and the abortion video both induced negative emotions and had a persistent 
effect of changing abortion attitudes (as measured by the abortion 
questionnaire) to a more pro-life stance.  Furthermore, although our results 
were not statistically significant, our findings suggest that people asked to 
down-regulate their emotions changed their attitudes less than people not 
given that instruction.  This is remarkable, considering Kohlberg’s 
insistence at presenting his participants with hypothetical and emotionally 
distant situations.  Kohlberg thought that interviewing the boys, instead of 
observing them make moral decisions, would create “conditions that support 
expression of the individual’s most mature moral thinking” (Colby & 
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Kohlberg, 1987, p. 120 as cited in Krebs & Denton, 2005).  Our results 
suggest that if he had presented his participants with an emotional situation, 
their responses may have been quite different. 
 However, our manipulation did not significantly change negative 
emotion, as measured by the PANAS.  People in the down-regulation 
condition did not change their negative emotions any more or less than 
people in the no-regulation condition.  However, even though people in the 
down-regulation condition did not change their emotions more than people 
in the no-regulation condition, our manipulation succeeded in limiting the 
change in abortion attitudes for the people who heard the down-regulation 
instructions. 
Problems and Future Directions 
 I attempted to test the first stage in Haidt’s model by instilling more 
or less affect in my participants and observing how that differentially altered 
their moral judgments.  By observing how moral judgments changed based 
solely on a change in affect, I attempted to ascertain whether emotion 
precedes moral judgment or moral judgment precedes emotion.  However, 
the fourth link of Haidt’s (2001) thesis suggests that people care about the 
social position of the persuader.  I found that some of the participants’ 
abortion attitudes actually became more pro-choice as a result of the video.  
Participants who thought that the video was trying to change their attitudes 
might have not paid attention to the video – several of the participants 
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actually mentioned that the most disgusting part of the video was that it was 
trying to change their attitudes.  
 As mentioned before, I believe that the problem of emotion change 
was not one of manipulation but one of assessment.  Participants in the 
down-regulation condition might have changed their emotion less, but a 
ceiling effect, our inability to detect minute changes in emotion through the 
PANAS, and introspective error might have hid the manipulation.  
Therefore, a physiological measure of anger or disgust (e.g. sympathetic 
nervous system activation or stomach contractions) might have eliminated 
the measurement problems that I faced using the PANAS.  I also might test 
different emotion regulation instructions to determine the most successful 
instructions for limiting negative emotions of moral situations.  Even though 
Gross (1998) tested similar instructions with a disgust inducing situation (he 
used an amputated arm), I not only wanted to limit negative emotion, I also 
wanted to limit negative emotion to a moral situation and observe how this 
changed the participants’ moral stance.  My video might have been too 
emotionally arousing for our specific instructions. 
 For instance, 20-30 sec into the video, rather abruptly, a 
disembodied fetus protruded from the mother covered in blood.  As the 
participants revealed in the open-ended questionnaire, the immediacy and 
unexpectedness of the disgusting images might have instigated automatic 
reactions before our participants had a chance to use any cognitive control 
strategies to regulate their emotions.  Furthermore, different attitude 
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structures might have allowed some participants to better regulate their 
emotions than other participants.  Huskinson and Haddock (2004) found that 
people who had high “Need for Cognition” scores and low “Need for 
Affect” scores on a questionnaire evaluated objects in cognitive terms, while 
people who had high “Need for Affect” scores and low “Need for 
Cognition” scores evaluated objects in affective terms.  They labeled the 
first category as Cognitive Based Attitudes and the last category as 
Affective Based Attitudes.  Not surprisingly, they found that affective 
persuasion techniques were more successful amongst people with a high 
need for affect while cognitive persuasion techniques were more successful 
amongst people with a high need for cognition (e.g. philosophers).  
Moreover, as Haidt (2001) explained 
Children start off with limited ability to resist temptation, 
but as the hippocampus and frontal cortex finish their 
development, children become more able to inhibit 
impulsive behaviors.  Some children start off with a more 
effective cool system because of better or faster frontal 
cortex development.  Frontal cortex development makes 
these children smarter, and they therefore perform better on 
measures of moral reasoning, but their improved moral 
behavior comes more from their greater self-regulatory 
abilities than from their greater moral reasoning abilities.  
p. 823 
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Future studies should assess the difference between a cognitive disposition 
and an affective disposition in emotion regulation strategies as it applies to 
moral situations.  Some people (e.g., philosophers or academics) might have 
more training in analyzing emotional situations than other people.  If I 
compared people with a cognitive disposition to people with an emotional 
disposition, I might find that people who have a cognitive disposition are 
better able to implement the cognitive regulation strategies required to 
override their initial emotional reactions. 
Conclusion 
 Haidt’s (2001) thesis generally held, and moral emotions related to 
opinions of a moral issue.  Furthermore, just by telling participants to 
regulate their emotions, I found that those participants were persuaded less 
by a moral video.  However, more research needs to be done assessing the 
specific ways of changing moral emotions and the specific dispositions 
better able to regulate emotions.  Haidt, Kohler, and Dias (1993) found that 
college students from America decided that an act was wrong based on 
whether or not it harmed somebody; however, they also found that this 
effect was more pronounced in academic situations.  To actually assess the 
constructs of disgust and other moral emotions as they relate to moral 
decisions, we need to leave academia and test participants in real situations.  
Kohlberg’s main assessment problems were his insistence on presenting 
participants with artificial and hypothetical situations and judging how they 
would react in every situation based on those assessments.  Instead of 
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testing participants in a similar situation (e.g. a psychological research lab 
watching a video), we need to put participants in situations where they 
would have to make the moral decisions that we are asking them to judge.  
Only then could we know whether they truly believe their attitudes. 
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Measures 
44 
 
 
1. Abortion should be legal. 
 
 
 
2. Abortions should be legal in the case of incest. 
 
 
 
3. Abortions should be legal in the case of rape. 
 
 
 
4. Abortion should be equally available regardless of income. 
 
 
 
5. Abortion should be legal when the mother’s health is in danger. 
 
 
 
6. Abortion should be available through public health clinics. 
 
 
 
7. The law has no right to tell a woman what to do with her body. 
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8. Abortions should be legal if birth control fails. 
 
 
 
9. The United Way should support agencies which provide abortions. 
 
 
 
10. Federal, state, or local tax money should be used to provide 
abortions. 
 
 
 
11. Abortion is murder. 
 
 
 
12. Abortion is against my beliefs. 
 
 
 
13. Life exists from the moment of conception. 
 
 
 
 
14. Abortion is a sin against God. 
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15. A fetus is a human being. 
 
 
 
16. A fetus should have legal rights. 
 
 
 
17. Abortion after the first trimester is murder. 
 
 
 
18. Abortion should be entirely the woman’s decision. 
 
 
 
19. The father should have the right to prevent the mother from having 
an abortion. 
 
 
 
20. A woman should have to tell the father before having an abortion. 
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Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 
1. I am sensitive to internal bodily tensions. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  
strongly  strongly 
disagree  agree 
 
2. I know immediately when my mouth or throat gets dry. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly  strongly 
disagree  agree 
 
3. I can often feel my heart beating. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly  strongly 
disagree  agree 
 
4. I am quick to sense the hunger contractions of my stomach. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly  strongly 
disagree  agree 
 
5. I am very aware of changes in my body temperature. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
strongly  strongly 
disagree  agree 
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We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, 
how you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. We are interested in 
two aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you 
feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your 
emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following 
questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each 
item, please answer using the following scale: 
 
1-------------------------2------------------------------3--------------------------4---------------------------5 
Strongly Neutral Strongly 
Disagree  Agree 
 
1. ____  When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or 
amusement), I change what I’m thinking about. 
 
2. ____  I keep my emotions to myself. 
 
3. ____  When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I 
change what I’m thinking about. 
 
4. ____  When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
 
5. ____  When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it 
in a way that helps me stay calm. 
 
6. ____  I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
 
7. ____  When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m 
thinking about the situation. 
 
8. ____  I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation 
I’m in. 
 
9. ____  When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
 
10. ____  When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m 
thinking about the situation.
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Figures 
 
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
 
Figure 1.  The social intuitionist model of moral judgments.  The numbered 
links, drawn for Person A only, are (1) the intuitive judgment link, (2) the 
post hoc reasoning link, (3) the reasoned persuasion link, and (4) the social 
persuasion link.  Two additional links are hypothesized to occur less 
frequently: (5) the reasoned judgment link and (6) the private reflection link.  
From “The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach 
to moral judgment,” by J. Haidt, 2001, Psychological Review, 108, p. 818. 
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Figure 2.  Mean abortion attitudes by condition.  The vertical axis represents 
scores on the abortion attitudes questionnaire, in thousands, starting from 
8000 and ending at 14000.  The horizontal axis represents the time that the 
participant filled out the questionnaire.  The diamond shape represents the 
up-regulation condition, the triangle shape represents the down-regulation 
condition, and the square shape represents the no-regulation condition 
